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Abstract 
A new and easily implemented regression method is proposed for generating an index of 
exchange rate flexibility, whilst simultaneously identifying anchors of pegged currencies. The 
method can distinguish floats from pegs, including those with occasional devaluations. An 
annual index is calculated that can be compared with other regime classification schemes, or 
used directly in empirical research as a measure of exchange rate flexibility. Different 
categories in the IMF’s de facto classification, and also in the Reinhart-Rogoff classification, 
are associated with significantly different average values of the index. Further analysis of 
managed floats shows that they have a strong tendency to track the US dollar. 
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1 Introduction 
Until 1998 the International Monetary Fund reported only a country’s self-declared exchange 
rate regime, chosen from amongst a defined set of categories such as various types of peg, 
managed floating or independently floating (see Habermeier et al., 2009, Appendix B, for a 
brief history of the IMF classification system).  Dissatisfaction with the resulting outcomes, 
eloquently expressed by Calvo and Reinhart (2002), led to the development of alternative 
methods based on factual data such as exchange rate movements, reserve volatility and 
interest rate differentials (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2005; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; 
Shambaugh, 2004).  The IMF also began to record its own de facto assessment of the regime, 
alongside the reported de jure classification, using the same taxonomy. The weakness of this 
effort is that it conspicuously failed to develop a new consensus in classifying exchange rate 
regimes, since the new systems showed a low correlation with one another (Bleaney and 
Francisco, 2007; Frankel and Wei, 2008).  An extended discussion of these classification 
systems appears in Klein and Shambaugh (2010, Ch. 3), and also in the review article by 
Rose (2011).  Bleaney et al. (2015) argue that different criteria for drawing regime 
boundaries, rather than differences in statistical approaches, are the primary reason for the 
disappointingly high level of disagreements between classification schemes. 
 The schemes that seek to produce an alternative to the IMF classification by calendar 
year use different statistical criteria.  Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) use cluster 
analysis based on movements in exchange rates, international reserves and interest rates.  
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) prefer to use parallel-market exchange rates (if they exist), and 
discount large movements in up to 20% of observations, in an attempt to distinguish one-time 
devaluations from floats.  Shambaugh (2004) defines a peg by small monthly exchange rate 
movements in up to eleven out of twelve months. 
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 None of these approaches uses regression methods.  Regression methods have been 
successfully used to identify the basket of anchor currencies to which a currency is pegged 
(Frankel and Wei, 1995).  More recently, Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2006) and Frankel and Wei 
(2008) have independently suggested that similar regression methods can distinguish pegs 
from floats as well.  In this paper, we pursue a similar line of inquiry that, in our view, 
improves on previous work.  We show that regression analysis can be used to generate 
statistics that distinguish floats from pegs, including those with occasional devaluations, with 
a high degree of accuracy.  It is also a simple way of generating annual measures of exchange 
rate flexibility, requiring only end-of-month exchange rate data. 
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  In Section Two, previous approaches to 
exchange rate regime classification by regression methods are reviewed.  Our alternative is 
presented in Section Three.  Section Four shows the results of our method by IMF de facto 
regime category, applied to two separate periods: 1999-2005 and 2006-13.  Some illustrative 
examples are given in Section Five.  In Section Six robustness to the choice of numeraire 
currency is discussed.  Section Seven examines managed floats more deeply.  Section Eight 
investigates whether the system can be used to generate annual measures of exchange rate 
flexibility.  Conclusions are presented in Section Nine. 
 
2 Literature Review 
Exchange rate classification schemes are based on the idea that, at least at either end of the 
spectrum, exchange rates behave quite differently, even if there are some intermediate cases 
that are difficult to classify.  Consider a target zone with a central rate of x and permitted 
deviation of z, so the zone is (x ± z).  If z is small, the exchange rate will have relatively low 
volatility; as z increases, volatility rises towards levels that are typical of a free float.  
Distinguishing “pegs” from “floats” is motivated by the observation that in many cases z is 
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small, and so these regimes can be identified as pegs. Finding an appropriate boundary 
between pegs and floats is problematic, however, particularly in cases where x undergoes a 
step change (a realignment) or follows a trend (a crawling peg or band), or where no value of 
x or z is announced but the data suggest that the unannounced policy regime is effectively 
some kind of target zone (a managed float).  We now briefly review previous attempts to use 
regression methods to distinguish pegs from floats. 
The standard regression specification for identifying the basket of currencies to which 
currency i is pegged (e.g. Frankel and Wei, 1995) relates exchange rate movements of 
currency i against some numeraire currency N to movements of potential anchor currencies 
against N: 
 
∆ln𝐸𝐸(𝑖𝑖,𝑁𝑁)𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏∆ ln𝐸𝐸(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑁𝑁)𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸,𝑁𝑁)𝑡𝑡 + 𝑑𝑑∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁,𝑁𝑁)𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 (1) 
 
where USD is the US dollar, EUR is the euro, YEN is the Japanese yen, E(i, N) is the number 
of units of currency i per unit of currency N, and ∆ is the first-difference operator.   If 
currency i is pegged to a single one of these currencies, the coefficient of that currency 
should be one, and of the others zero; if the basket is correctly identified, the three 
coefficients should sum to one. 
 The issue is whether a similar equation can also distinguish floats from pegs, as has 
been claimed by Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2006) and Frankel and Wei (2008).  Bénassy-Quéré et 
al. (2006) avoid the choice of a numeraire currency by noting that, if b+c+d = 1, then a 
weighted average of exchange rates of currency i against the three anchors should remain 
unchanged: 
  𝑏𝑏∆ ln𝐸𝐸(𝑖𝑖,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈)𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸(𝑖𝑖,𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸)𝑡𝑡 + 𝑑𝑑∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸(𝑖𝑖,𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁)𝑡𝑡 = 0 if b+c+d = 1  (2) 
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After estimating equation (2), the authors focus on the estimates of the individual coefficients 
b, c and d.  They identify a currency as floating only if none of them is significantly different 
from zero.  This approach appears to suffer from two drawbacks. One is that, because of the 
focus on statistical significance, the standard errors of the coefficients could have as much 
influence on the result as the point estimates.  The other is that, given the constraint that the 
estimated coefficients must sum to one, the test is biased towards rejecting the null; and 
indeed less than 10% of the sample is identified as floats (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2006, Table 
3).  As we shall see later, even freely floating currencies tend to co-move with others with 
which they have strong trading links, and are therefore likely in many cases to have non-zero 
euro or US dollar coefficients. 
 Frankel and Wei (2008) augment equation (1) with an exchange market pressure 
variable (EMP), which is equal to the log changes in the exchange rate of currency i against N 
minus changes in the logarithm of the ratio of international reserves to the monetary base.  
They thus estimate: 
 
∆ln𝐸𝐸(𝑖𝑖,𝑁𝑁)𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏∆ ln𝐸𝐸(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑁𝑁)𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸,𝑁𝑁)𝑡𝑡 + 𝑑𝑑∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁,𝑁𝑁)𝑡𝑡 + 𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡                                         +𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡         (3) 
 
In fact Frankel and Wei arrive at this specification by including the British pound as an 
additional anchor, and then subtracting the pound-numeraire exchange rate from all the other 
exchange rate variables to impose the condition that the basket weights sum to one, without 
noticing that this procedure is equivalent to estimating a regression with unrestricted basket 
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weights using the pound as numeraire.1  They focus on the coefficient of this EMP variable, 
arguing that it will be close to zero for pegs, and significantly different from zero for floats.  
They broadly confirm this pattern using twenty example currencies.  Slavov (2013) applies 
this method to investigate the behaviour of nominally floating currencies in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
 Apart from the fact that the test is not infallible (Australia is an example, as Frankel 
and Wei point out), there are some econometric problems here.  One component of the EMP 
variable is the dependent variable itself; consequently this component should always have a 
coefficient of one, as well as being necessarily correlated with the error term, which 
introduces bias into the estimates.  The reserves component is also endogenous to exchange 
rate changes because the money supply is denominated in domestic currency and reserves in 
foreign currency.   When the exchange rate depreciates, the ratio of reserves to the monetary 
base will tend to increase even if reserves remain unchanged. 
 
3 A New Approach 
In this paper we start from the position that, for identifying the type of regime (as opposed to 
the possible basket of anchor currencies), the appropriate statistics from a regression equation 
like (1) should be based on the volatility and pattern of residuals rather than the estimated 
coefficients.  At a second stage, if the relevant statistics indicate a peg by whatever criterion is 
chosen, then the coefficients can be used to identify the anchor basket. 
 Our baseline regression is: 
 
∆ln𝐸𝐸(𝑖𝑖,𝑁𝑁)𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏∆ ln𝐸𝐸(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈,𝑁𝑁)𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸(𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈𝐸𝐸,𝑁𝑁)𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡                                      (4) 
                                                     
1 This arises because, for any currency j, ln E(j, N) – ln E(GBP, N) = ln E(j, GBP). The original numeraire 
simply disappears from the estimated equation, which reduces to an unrestricted regression with the GBP as 
numeraire. 
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The numeraire currency is the Swiss franc.   Initially we included the Japanese yen as well, as 
in equation (1), but its coefficients were almost always insignificant.  Instead we use the yen 
as an alternative numeraire, to check the sensitivity of the results to the choice of numeraire.  
For some currencies we added other potential anchor currencies to the equation, as follows: 
South African Rand – added for Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. 
Indian Rupee – added for Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Seychelles and Sri 
Lanka. 
Australian and New Zealand Dollars – added for Fiji, Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Tonga and Vanuatu. 
Singapore Dollar – added for Brunei. 
 To measure volatility, we use the root mean square error (RMSE) and the R-squared 
of equation (4).2  We expect the RMSE to be low and the R-squared to be high for pegs, and 
vice versa for floats.  We have not made any attempt to measure the strength of shocks, 
which for floating currencies should be reflected in the residuals; for pegs shocks might be 
reflected in interest rate changes or reserve movements.  This is because we regard the size of 
the residuals as a crucial indicator of the exchange rate regime, and we do not want that 
indicator to be reduced artificially for some floating currencies by adding a variable that 
happens to be highly correlated with exchange rate movements.3 
In the remainder of the paper we discuss the performance of these statistics in 
distinguishing floats from pegs. There is an issue of possible regime change within the 
sample period.  In general this will cause parameter instability, and reduce the goodness of fit 
of the regression. Even if a country stays on a peg but switches, say, from a single-currency 
peg to a basket peg, this will increase the size of the residuals.  It is important, therefore, to 
                                                     
2 Other possible statistics based on the residuals from (4) are discussed in Bleaney et al. (2015). 
3 In this respect we are following the practice of most de facto exchange rate regime classification schemes in 
focusing exclusively on exchange rate behaviour (see Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2005, for an exception). 
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identify when switches of regime seem to have occurred, and estimating the model over sub-
periods may be helpful in this respect. 
   
4 Main Results by IMF de facto Regime 
In this section we show the results of estimating equation (4) for two separate periods: 
January 1999 to December 2005 (83 months), and January 2006 to June 2013 (90 months).   
We omitted any countries which had switched de facto regime, according to the IMF, during 
the period.  These periods give us two samples of more than 80 monthly observations each.  
The IMF classification relies on IMF officials’ judgement, according to a well-defined set of 
instructions, rather than a statistical algorithm.4  Table 1 shows the means for each IMF de 
facto regime, and whether the mean is significantly different from the mean for a 
conventional peg.  The top panel of Table 1 refers to the earlier period and the bottom panel 
to the later period. 
 What emerges quite clearly is that floats look different from pegs.  Pegs tend to have 
RMSEs below or close to 0.01, whereas for independent floats the RMSE tends to be above 
0.02, and the average in each period is above 0.025.  This pattern is mirrored in the R-
squareds.  For independent floats the R-squared averages below 0.5 in each period.  For pegs 
of any kind, the average R-squared is always greater than 0.8, and in most cases considerably 
closer to one than that.  For pegs and bands as a whole, the average RMSE is 0.0044 in 1999-
2005 and 0.0055 in 2006-13, and the average R-squared is 0.93 in each period.  Managed 
floats have an average RMSE of 0.0205 in 1999-2005 and 0.0245 in 2006-13, with average 
R-squareds of 0.622 and 0.630 respectively.   Moreover the statistics for managed and 
independent floats are significantly different from those for conventional pegs, whereas the 
                                                     
4 The details are given in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.  For 
a discussion of the evolution of the IMF classification, see Klein and Shambaugh (2010, Ch. 3). 
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statistics for other types of pegs and bands are not, which provides some justification for a 
binary peg/float distinction. 
  
 
 
Table 1. Regression statistics by IMF de facto regime 
 
IMF de facto regime No. currencies Mean RMSE Mean R-squared 
 January 1999 to December 2005 (83 months) 
Currency board 7 0.0037 0.870 
Conventional peg 24 0.0013 0.968 
Basket peg 5 0.0208 0.837 
Horizontal band 3 0.0058*** 0.835** 
Crawling peg 3 0.0018 0.995 
All pegs and bands 42 0.0044 0.929 
Managed float 22 0.0205*** 0.622*** 
Independent float 15 0.0256*** 0.475*** 
    
 January 2006 to June 2013 (90 months) 
Currency board 7 0.0023 0.975 
Conventional peg 28 0.0051 0.938 
Basket peg 4 0.0092 0.844 
Horizontal band 2 0.0062 0.917 
Crawling peg 3 0.0102 0.903 
All pegs and bands 44 0.0054 0.932 
Managed float 28 0.0439** 0.560*** 
Independent float 10 0.0258*** 0.414*** 
Notes. The statistics refer to the estimation of equation (4) for each currency.  
Currencies for which the IMF de facto classification records a regime 
change are omitted. *,**,***: significantly different from a conventional peg 
at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. The categories are as follows. 
Currency Board: officially announced as such. Conventional peg: peg to a 
single currency with ±1% variation. Basket Peg: peg to a basket of 
currencies with ±1% variation. Horizontal Band: peg with >±1% variation. 
Crawling Peg: Peg with trend in central rate.  Managed Float: residual 
category.  Independent Float: a floating currency with very infrequent 
intervention by the authorities. 
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This difference in means is encouraging but not necessarily compelling.  It does not tell us 
how much overlap there is between the distributions.  For example the high average RMSE of 
0.0208 for the five basket pegs in the 1999-2005 period suggests that one or two of them may 
look quite similar to floats according to these statistics. Indeed that is the case: the Libyan 
dinar has an RMSE of 0.081 and an R-squared of 0.021 in that period.  A particular issue is 
the devaluation of a pegged currency.  This is not a regime change, but in the regression it 
would produce a large residual for that month.  This would raise the RMSE and reduce the R-
squared, and could distort the other coefficients, as we show by an example in the next 
section. 
A symptom of one or more devaluations should be a distinctive pattern of residuals.  
In the event of a devaluation, positive residuals (representing a depreciation relative to the 
Swiss franc that is not explained by movements in the US dollar or the euro against the Swiss 
franc) should be relatively infrequent but occasionally large, and negative residuals should be 
on average much smaller but much more numerous.  In other words, the residuals in this case 
should be markedly positively skewed.  For genuine floats, we do not expect the residuals to 
be skewed in this way.  In fact in the sample shown in Table 1, skewness never exceeds two 
in absolute value for independent floats, but quite frequently does so for other regimes. 
 This suggests that the skewness of residuals can be used to identify months with 
possible parity changes.  For each of these months, a dummy variable that is equal to one for 
that month only, and zero otherwise, can be added to the regression.  The regression can then 
be rerun, and the RMSE and R-squared re-examined.  For pegs with occasional devaluations, 
the resulting statistics should now be in the expected range for pegs; for floats that just 
happened to have an usually large movement in one month, these statistics should be much 
less markedly affected by the inclusion of the dummies. 
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Table 2. Regression statistics by IMF de facto regime 
 with a dummy for a single outlying month 
 
IMF de facto regime No. currencies Mean RMSE Mean R-squared 
 January 1999 to December 2005 (83 months) 
Currency board 7 (2) 0.0034 0.884 
Conventional peg 24 (6) 0.0008 0.973 
Basket peg 5 (2) 0.0090** 0.934 
Horizontal band 3 (1) 0.0057*** 0.845** 
Crawling peg 3 (0) 0.0018 0.995 
All pegs and bands 42 (11) 0.0026 0.946 
Managed float 22 (5) 0.0185*** 0.680*** 
Independent float 15 (0) 0.0256*** 0.475*** 
    
 January 2006 to June 2013 (90 months) 
Currency board 7 (2) 0.0022 0.975 
Conventional peg 28 (6) 0.0030 0.970 
Basket peg 4 (1) 0.0044 0.967 
Horizontal band 2 (0) 0.0062 0.917 
Crawling peg 3 (1) 0.0086 0.910 
All pegs and bands 44 (10) 0.0035 0.964 
Managed float 28 (9) 0.0222*** 0.662*** 
Independent float 10 (2) 0.0252*** 0.439*** 
Notes. The statistics refer to the estimation of equation (4) for each currency, 
with the addition of the most significant dummy variable for a single 
outlying month if the F-statistic for that dummy variable’s exclusion from 
the regression exceeds 30.  Figures in parentheses are the number of 
currencies for which a dummy was included, using this criterion.  Currencies 
for which the IMF de facto classification records a regime change are 
omitted. *,**,***: significantly different from a conventional peg at the 10, 
5 and 1% levels respectively. 
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 Table 2 shows what happens if we include a dummy for a single outlying month in 
cases where that dummy is highly significant.  The procedure is as follows: if the sample is T 
months in length, we run T extra regressions for each country, each with a dummy =1 in just 
one month of the sample added to equation (4).  If the highest F-statistic for the addition of a 
dummy does not exceed 30 (equivalent to a t-statistic of √30 = 5.48), no dummies are added.  
If at least one F-statistic does exceed 30, we include a dummy for the month which yields the 
highest F-statistic, and no other dummies.  The presumption is that there was a parity change 
in that month.  Then we use the statistics from this augmented regression instead of the 
original one.5 
 In the case of Libya in the 1999-2005 period, the relevant month is January 2002, and 
the inclusion of a dummy for that month reduces the RMSE from 0.081 to 0.025, and raises 
the R-squared from 0.021 to 0.906.  Thus the R-squared is now solidly in the range for a peg, 
but the RMSE is still more typical of a float. 
 Table 2 shows that the dummy met the criterion for inclusion for eleven out of 42 
pegs and bands in 1999-2005, and for seven out of 44 in 2006-13.  The dummy was also 
included for five out of 22 managed floats in the first period, and for six out of 28 managed 
floats in the second, implying a significant parity change.  The dummy never met the 
criterion for inclusion for independent floats.  The inclusion of the dummy reduces the 
average RMSE for managed floats from 0.0205 to 0.0185 in 1999-2005, and from 0.0245 to 
0.0230 in 2006-13.  The R-squared for managed floats is 0.680 in the early period and 0.671 
in the later period, compared with 0.622 and 0.630 respectively in Table 1.  The average 
RMSE for all pegs and bands in Table 2 is 0.0026 in 1999-2005 and 0.0031 in 2006-13, 
compared with 0.0044 and 0.0055 respectively in Table 1, so the proportionate reduction in 
RMSE from the inclusion of the dummies is greater for pegs and bands than for managed 
                                                     
5 A sample of  twelve observations is too short to apply most standard tests for a structural break, but Monte 
Carlo simulations calibrated from the statistics in Table 2 show that a maximum F-statistic of 30 results in the 
incorrect inclusion of a dummy less than 1% of the time (based on 5000 replications). 
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floats.  The 1999-2005 average R-squared for all pegs and bands rises from 0.929 in Table 1 
to 0.941 in Table 2, and the 2006-13 average R-squared for all pegs and bands rises from 
0.942 to 0.971. 
 Overall, these results suggest that a search for outlying residuals in equation (4) 
should enable pegs with occasional devaluations to be distinguished from genuine floats. 
 Managed floats are difficult to evaluate in general, because their behaviour depends 
very much on how they are managed.  As we shall show later, our methodology reveals that, 
while some seem relatively lightly managed, others are quite close to a form of peg, usually 
to the US dollar. 
 
5 Some Examples 
Table 3 gives some examples for pegs and bands (target zones wider than ±1%).  In the first 
column, the CFA franc from 1999 to 2005 is typical of an exact peg to a single currency: the 
US dollar coefficient is zero, the euro coefficient is exactly 1.00, the R-squared is 1.00 and 
the RMSE is 0.000.  Typical of a slightly looser peg is China from 1999 to 2005, shown in 
column (2): the US dollar coefficient is 1.001, with a t-statistic of 693, the euro coefficient is 
0.015 and insignificant, the R-squared is 0.99 and the RMSE is 0.0023. 
An example of a basket peg (Fiji 1999-2005) is given in column (3): all four 
currencies have weights significantly different from zero, the R-squared is 0.98 and the 
RMSE is 0.0035.   In column (4), Tonga 2006-13 shows the difference between a peg and a 
band.  The US dollar, the Australian dollar and the New Zealand dollar all have significant 
coefficients, but the R-squared is lower than for Fiji, at 0.85, and the RMSE is higher 
(0.0099).  In column (5), China 2006-13 is a good example of a crawling peg (in this case an 
appreciating one).  The constant is significant and implies an appreciation of about 0.3% per 
-13- 
month, but the other statistics are typical of a peg, with an R-squared of 0.99 and an RMSE of 
0.0041. 
 
In all of these cases except China 1999-2005, the skewness of the residuals is small in 
absolute terms, which suggests that there was no parity change during the period.  In the case 
of China 1999-2005, skewness is -8.76, which indicates an appreciation at some date.  Table 
4 shows the effects of introducing a dummy for an outlying month for two cases: the CFA 
franc, which was devalued by a very large amount in January 1994, from January 1990 to 
December 1998, and China 1999-2005.  It can be seen that, for the CFA franc, the January 
1994 episode greatly affects the results: without the dummy variable for that month (column 
1), the R-squared is only 0.08, and the RMSE is extremely high, at 0.0670.  Even the French 
franc coefficient is distorted, at 1.566 rather than 1.00.  Only the residual skewness of 10.08 
indicates that this is the effect of one or more large devaluations rather than floating.  Once 
the January 1994 dummy is included (column 2), the fit is perfect and the French franc 
coefficient is exactly one. 
In the case of China 1999-2005, introducing a dummy for July 2005 (column 4 of 
Table 4) reduces skewness from -8.76 to -0.58, even though the estimated appreciation in that 
month is very small (2.1%). 
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Table 3.   Some examples of pegs and bands 
 
Episode CFA franc  1999-2005 
China 
 1999-2005 
Fiji 
1999-2005 
Tonga 
2006-13 
China 
2006-13 
IMF regime Conv’l peg Conv’l peg Basket peg Band Crawling  peg 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
US dollar 0.000 1.001*** 0.298*** 0.515*** 0.957*** 
 (0.83) (693) (18.0) (12.9) (57.6) 
Euro 1.00*** 0.015 0.122** -0.094 0.031 
 (28413) (0.97) (2.31) (-1.03) (1.43) 
AU dollar   0.331*** 0.173***  
   (16.9) (3.48)  
NZ dollar   0.210*** 0.235***  
   (8.92) (4.88)  
Constant -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003*** 
 (-0.00) (-1.20) (-0.36) (-0.26) (64.84) 
Obs. 83 83 83 90 90 
R-squared 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.85 0.99 
RMSE 0.0000 0.0023 0.0035 0.0099 0.0041 
Skewness 0.303 -8.758 0.408 -0.963 -0.697 
Notes.  The table refers to equation (4), with the monthly change in the log of the 
number of currency units per Swiss franc as the dependent variable.  Figures in 
parentheses are t-statistics.  *, **, *** denote significant at 10, 5 and 1% 
respectively. For 1990-98 the French franc is used in place of the euro. 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Introducing a dummy for a single outlying month 
 
Episode CFA franc 1990-98 China 1999-2005 
IMF regime Conv’l peg Conv’l peg 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
US dollar -0.053 -0.000* 1.001*** 1.000*** 
 (-0.249) (-1.69) (109.093) (1068.43) 
Euro (FR franc) 1.566 1.000*** 0.015 0.000 
 (2.818)*** (509181.46) (0.522) (0.17) 
Outlying Dummy  0.693***  -0.021*** 
  (2914011.62)  (-87.21) 
Constant 0.006 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.932) (-0.09) (-1.230) (-2.12) 
Obs. 108 108 83 83 
R-squared 0.08 1.00 0.99 1.00 
RMSE 0.0670 0.0000 0.0023 0.0002 
Outlying Month  1994m1  2005m7 
Skewness 10.082 0.000 -8.758 -0.574 
Notes. See notes to Table 3. 
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Table 5 shows some examples of floats, all from 2006-13. In the first two columns, 
Japan and Brazil are both classified as independent floats.  For Japan the R-squared is 0.53 
and the RMSE is 0.0274.  For Brazil the R-squared is very low, at 0.19, and the RMSE is 
0.0397.  Skewness is 0.600 and 1.023 respectively, so not particularly high.  Japan has a 
surprisingly high US dollar coefficient, at 0.885, but a negative euro coefficient.6 Brazil has 
significant positive coefficients for both (0.348 for the US dollar and 0.564 for the euro). 
The remaining four columns of Table 5 are all examples of managed floats.  India 
looks very similar to the independent floats: low R-squared (0.47), high RMSE (0.0233) and 
low skewness (0.074).  The US dollar and euro coefficients are significant, but overall the 
management appears to be quite light: the exchange rate displays much more variation than 
under a peg.  Kenya shows a similar pattern (R-squared of 0.12, RMSE of 0.0309 and 
skewness of  0.697), but only the euro coefficient is significant, and the US dollar coefficient 
is quite low.  The last two columns show two cases where the managed float appears more 
like a target zone for the exchange rate against the US dollar.  In the case of Bangladesh, the 
US dollar coefficient is 0.996, the R-squared is 0.88 and the RMSE is 0.0126 – much closer 
to the peg range than one would expect for a float.  Jamaica is essentially similar, with a US 
dollar coefficient of 0.913, an R-squared of 0.89 and an RMSE of 0.0113. For Jamaica there 
is also a marked trend depreciation, with a significant intercept term of 0.5% per month. 
Table 6 shows that in both of these last two cases there seems to have been an 
outlying month with a devaluation of about 6% (December 2011 for Bangladesh and January 
2009 for Jamaica).  Inclusion of the dummy makes their attachment to the US dollar look 
even stronger. 
  
                                                     
6 In 1999-2005, Japan shows a similar pattern: a US dollar coefficient of 0.649 and a negative euro coefficient. 
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Table 5.   Some examples of independent and managed floats 
 
Episode: Japan 2006-13 
Brazil 
2006-13 
India 
2006-13 
Kenya 
2006-13 
Bangladesh 
2006-13 
Jamaica 
2006-13 
IMF regime Indep’t Float 
Indep’t 
float 
Managed 
float 
Managed 
float 
Managed 
Float 
Managed 
float 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
US dollar 0.885*** 0.348*** 0.530*** 0.158 0.996*** 0.913*** 
 (9.88) (2.68) (6.96) (1.57) (19.363) (24.713) 
Euro -0.365** 0.564** 0.363*** 0.419** 0.029 0.074 
 (-2.40) (2.56) (2.80) (2.44) (0.400) (1.182) 
Indian 
rupee     -0.030  
     (-0.509)  
Constant -0.001 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.005*** 
 (-0.23) (0.09) (1.59) (1.08) (1.419) (4.270) 
Obs. 90 90 90 90 90 90 
R-squared 0.53 0.19 0.47 0.12 0.88 0.89 
RMSE 0.0274 0.0397 0.0233 0.0309 0.0126 0.0113 
Skewness 0.600 1.023 0.074 0.697 1.714 1.943 
Notes.  See notes to Table 3. 
 
 
 
Table 6.  Introducing a dummy for a single outlying month 
 
Episode Bangladesh 2006-13 Jamaica 2006-13 
IMF regime Managed Float Managed float 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
US dollar 0.996 1.018*** 0.913*** 0.970*** 
 (19.363)*** (23.02) (24.713) (29.99) 
Euro 0.029 -0.005 0.074 0.056 
 (0.400) (-0.07) (1.182) (1.05) 
Indian rupee -0.030 -0.031   
 (-0.509) (-0.63)   
Outlying Dummy  0.062***  0.061*** 
  (5.68)  (6.14) 
Constant 0.002 0.001 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 (1.419) (1.07) (4.270) (4.22) 
Obs. 90 90 90 90 
R-squared 0.88 0.91 0.89 0.92 
RMSE 0.0126 0.0108 0.0113 0.0095 
Outlying Month  2011m12  2009m1 
Skewness 1.714 0.362 1.943 1.281 
Notes. See notes to Table 3. 
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6 The Choice of Numeraire 
 How much difference does the choice of numeraire make?  Table 7 shows the correlation of 
various regression statistics using other independently floating currencies as alternative 
numeraires to the Swiss franc.  The correlations are generally high.   The R-squared, RMSE 
and skewness always have correlations above 0.8, and in more than half the cases above 0.9.  
The correlations for the intercept coefficient are particularly high, always exceeding 0.95.  
The correlations for the US dollar coefficient always exceed 0.9, except in the case of the 
SDR, for which the correlation is 0.722 in 1999-2005 and 0.760 in 2006-13.  These lower 
correlations no doubt reflect the weight of the US dollar in the SDR basket. For the euro 
coefficients, the correlations are also lower for the SDR than for the other currencies, 
although to a lesser degree, probably because the weight of the euro in the SDR basket is less 
than that of the US dollar.  For the euro coefficient, there is a marked difference between the 
two periods.  In 2006-13 the euro coefficient correlations for currencies other than the SDR 
always exceed 0.9, whereas in 1999-2005 they lie in the range 0.66 to 0.73. This may reflect 
the fact that the Swiss franc was particularly stable against the euro in this period, making the 
euro coefficient harder to estimate when the Swiss franc is used as the numeraire.    
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Table 7.  Correlations between statistics with different numeraires  
 
Alternative 
 numeraire: 
Japanese 
yen 
British 
pound 
Canadian 
Dollar 
Chilean 
 peso 
Special 
drawing 
rights 
 1999/01 - 2005/12 
US$ coefficient 0.969 0.970 0.905 0.925 0.722 
Euro coefficient 0.722 0.685 0.663 0.683 0.607 
Intercept 0.999 0.999 0.995 0.998 0.998 
R-squared 0.852 0.921 0.830 0.803 0.833 
RMSE 0.996 0.998 0.997 0.995 0.999 
Skewness 0.933 0.914 0.894 0.947 0.934 
  
 2006/01 - 2013/06 
US$ coefficient 0.955 0.981 0.970 0.986 0.780 
Euro coefficient 0.943 0.906 0.915 0.926 0.825 
Intercept 0.989 0.984 0.985 0.984 0.984 
R-squared 0.835 0.947 0.969 0.947 0.838 
RMSE 0.981 0.991 0.986 0.972 0.995 
Skewness 0.742 0.993 0.747 0.987 0.992 
Notes. The statistics are the correlation coefficients between two 
alternative versions of equation (4), estimated with either the Swiss franc 
or the currency listed at the top of the column as numeraire, and with the 
inclusion of a dummy for an outlying month if the criteria described in 
Section 4 are met. 
 
Nevertheless it is vital that the numeraire currency should float relative to the anchor 
currencies used in the regression, and therefore it is always wise to test the robustness of 
results to alternative numeraires.  It is also important to identify anchor currencies correctly.  
If currency A is pegged to currency B, but currency B is omitted from the regression, 
currency A will tend to appear to have a regime similar to currency B, which may not be a 
peg. 
 
7 What Are Managed Floats Doing? 
 Managed floats are a bit of a black box.  Calvo and Reinhart (2002) suggested that many 
were not floating in any meaningful sense.  Bleaney and Tian (2012) showed that managed 
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floats tend to have quite low bilateral volatility against the US dollar.  Slavov (2013) finds a 
high degree of attachment to the US dollar amongst floating sub-Saharan African countries. 
 It seems likely that many managed floats are quite lightly managed, whilst others are 
rather close to pegs of some kind.  Suppose that we define managed floats that have an 
RMSE of less than 0.015 (greater than virtually all pegs but less than virtually all independent 
floats) and a regression coefficient of greater than 0.90 for the US dollar or the euro as a 
quasi-peg to that currency.  Then we find that, for the sample used in Tables 1 and 2, five out 
of 22 managed floats in 1999-2005 and two out of 28 in 2006-13 qualify as quasi-pegs to the 
US dollar.  Thus a minority – but a diminishing minority – of managed floats appear to fall 
into this category.  Table 8 shows that the quasi-pegs also have much higher R-squareds than 
is typical of other managed floats.  The Table also shows that the difference in average 
RMSE and average R-squared is significant at the one percent level in each case. 
 
 
Table 8.  Different Types of Managed Floats 
 
 Number Average RMSE Average R-squared 
 1999-2005 
Quasi-Pegs to US$ 5 (1) 0.0080*** 0.924*** 
Other Managed Floats 17 (4) 0.0217 0.608 
  
 2006-13 
Quasi-Pegs to US$ 4 (1) 0.0132*** 0.861*** 
Other Managed Floats 24 (8) 0.0237 0.629 
Notes.  The statistics are based on equation (4) with the inclusion of a dummy for an 
outlying month if the criteria described in Section 4 are met. The number in 
parentheses indicates the number of countries for which a dummy was included. 
“Other” managed floats are those that are not quasi-pegs to the US dollar or the euro. 
*,**,***: significantly different from Other Managed Floats at the 10, 5 and 1% 
levels respectively. 
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 A separate question is whether even managed floats that are not quasi-pegs to the US 
dollar are managed with particular attention to the bilateral rate against the US dollar.  This 
question can be addressed by comparing the US dollar coefficients of these managed floats 
with those of independent floats (see Table 9).  In the 1999-2005 period, the average US 
dollar coefficient of “other” managed floats is 0.781, which is slightly higher than the average 
of 0.697 for independent floats, but the difference is not statistically significant.  In 2006-13, 
by contrast, the average US dollar coefficient of “other” managed floats is still quite high, at 
0.668, wheareas the average for independent floats is much lower, at 0.187, and the 
difference is statistically significant at the one percent level.   The euro coefficients are very 
similar across the two periods for each group (0.315 and 0.340 for “other” managed floats; 
0.700 and 0.680 for independent floats), but much lower for independent floats, although the 
difference is only significant at the five percent level for the 2006-13 period.  Of course 
geographical factors may be involved here, as we investigate below. 
 The bottom panel of Table 9 shows the average coefficients for the seven currencies 
that were independent floats in the IMF de facto classification throughout the 1999-2013 
period.  The difference between the US dollar coefficients in the two periods is now much 
smaller, but a large difference now appears between the euro coefficients in the two periods.  
Considerable volatility in the coefficients of equation (4) is to be expected for genuinely 
floating countries. 
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Table 9.  Average US$ and Euro Coefficients of Different Types of Floats 
 
 Number Average US$ 
 coefficient 
Average euro 
 coefficient 
 1999-2005 
Quasi-Pegs to US$ 5 (1) 0.997*** 0.040*** 
Other Managed Floats 17 (4) 0.781 0.315* 
Independent Floats 15 (0) 0.697 0.700 
  
 2006-13 
Quasi-Pegs to US$ 4 (1) 0.919*** 0.091*** 
Other Managed Floats 24 (8) 0.668*** 0.340** 
Independent Floats 10 (2) 0.187 0.680 
  
 Statistics for the same seven independent floats 
1999-2005 7 (0) 0.51 0.93 
2006-13 7 (1) 0.32 0.50 
Notes.  See notes to Table 8. The seven countries in the bottom panel are: Australia, 
Canada, Chile, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom. *,**,***: 
significantly different from Independent Floats at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. 
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Even for independent floats, one would expect a positive relationship between a 
country’s importance as a trading partner and its coefficient in equation (4).  If, for example, 
for country j trade with the United States is of overwhelming importance, the US dollar will 
have a large weight in the country’s effective exchange rate, and for that reason country j’s 
bilateral exchange rate against third currencies will tend to move with that of the US dollar.  
If floats are heavily managed, they may show a different pattern.  To investigate this, Table 
10 shows a regression of estimated coefficients from equation (4) on trade shares for a 
sample of independent and “other” managed floats, allowing the intercept and trade share 
coefficient to differ between them. Column (1) of Table 10 uses US dollar coefficients and 
trade shares, Column (2) uses euro coefficients and trade shares, and Column (3) uses the 
difference between the two. 
 The results show that the trade share coefficient is always positive, significantly so in 
Columns (1) and (3), which supports the hypothesis that trade flows influence exchange rate 
behaviour in independent floats.  The trade share coefficients interacted with the managed 
float dummy are always negative, although not significantly so, indicating a weaker 
relationship.  The coefficients of the managed float dummy show that, for given trade shares, 
managed floats have higher US dollar coefficients and lower euro coefficients than do 
independent floats.  This is what we expect to see if floats are managed with more of an eye 
to the US dollar exchange rate and less to the euro exchange rate.  The positive coefficients in 
columns (1) and (3) have t-statistics that exceed four.  The negative coefficient in column (2) 
is only significant at the 10% level but almost as large in absolute value as that in column (1).  
These results confirm the suggestion of Bleaney and Tian (2012) and Slavov (2013) that 
managed floats pay close attention to exchange rate stability against the US dollar. 
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Table 10. Coefficients and Trade Shares for Different Types of Floats 
 
 Dependent Variables 
 b_USD b_EUR b_USD – b_EUR 
 (1) (2) (3) 
TradeShare_US 0.722   
(TSUS) (2.94)***   
TradeShare_Euro  0.436  
(TSEU)  (0.94)  
TSUS - TSEU   0.710 
   (2.17)** 
Managed Float Dummy  0.448 -0.375 0.728 
(MFDUM) (4.05)*** (-1.76)* (4.12)*** 
MFDUM * TSUS -0.928   
 (-1.80)*   
MFDUM * TSEU  -0.012  
  (-0.02)  
MFDUM *   -0.052 
(TSUS – TSEU)   (-0.08) 
Dummy 2006-13 -0.215 0.001 -0.216 
 (-3.03)*** (0.01) (-1.44) 
Constant 0.441 0.585 -0.064 
 (4.72)*** (2.70)*** (-0.37) 
Observations 67 67 67 
R-squared 0.31 0.19 0.29 
RMSE 0.289 0.4415 0.6257 
Notes. Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  The dependent variables are the US 
dollar coefficient (b_USD) in column (1), the euro coefficient (b_EUR) in 
column (2), and the difference between them in column (3), using the same 
regression as used for Table 9. The sample consists of “Other” Managed Floats 
(MFDUM = 1) and Independent Floats (MFDUM =0) without regime switches 
1999-2005 and 2006-13. Trade Share variables are the share of the US/Euro 
Area in the country’s trade, or in column (3) the difference between them. 
“Dummy 2006-13” is equal to one if the coefficient is from 2006-13, and equal 
to zero if the coefficient  is from 1999-2005. ***, **, *: significantly different 
from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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8 Generating Annual Measures of Exchange Rate Flexibility 
It is often useful to have an annual measure of exchange rate flexibility, or an annual 
classification of exchange rate regimes, in order to assess how macroeconomic variables such 
as growth, inflation and fiscal balances vary across regimes, to capture trends in regime 
choice over time, or simply to provide a comparison with earlier classification schemes that 
are organized by calendar year.  The main issue for any regression method applied to a 
relatively short period is the loss of degrees of freedom.  Applied to twelve monthly changes, 
equation (4) would have only nine degrees of freedom (fewer if extra potential anchor 
currencies are included), and only eight once a parity change in one month is allowed for. 
 In order to generate an annual index of exchange rate flexibility for each country-year 
observation, we adopt the following algorithm. 
1) Estimate equation (4) for the twelve monthly exchange rate changes in the year, 
adding potential anchor currencies to the US dollar and the euro as appropriate. 
2) Add a dummy for January to the regression, then replace that with a dummy for 
February, and so on. Record the lowest of these twelve RMSEs as the index of 
exchange rate flexibility. 
We have calculated this index for all years from 1970 to 2014 for three different 
numéraire currencies (the Swiss franc, the Japanese yen and the British pound), and the data 
are available in the online appendix.7  The distribution of the index is shown in Figure 1.  It is 
unimodal with a long right tail, reflecting the fact that floats vary considerably in their degree 
of exchange rate volatility.    
                                                     
7 In an earlier version of this paper (Bleaney and Tian, 2014), we used the Swiss franc version of this index to 
generate a binary peg/float classification for each country in each year, and compared it with other classification 
schemes. 
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Figure 1.  The distribution of annual RMSEs (CHF as numeraire) 
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Table 11 shows Poisson regressions of two measures of exchange rate flexibility (the 
RMSE and the R-squared) on the IMF classification categories for three numeraire currencies: 
the Swiss franc, the Japanese yen and the British pound.8  It is particularly important to check 
other numeraires, since the Swiss franc was not allowed to float freely for a period (from 
September 2011 to January 2015).   The results show that all the coefficients have the 
expected signs and practically every category is significantly different from a conventional 
peg, with only a hard peg having a lower RMSE and a higher R-squared.  Moreover the 
coefficient signs for the R-squared are always the opposite of the signs for the RMSE.  It is 
also reassuring that the results are similar for the different numeraires. 
Table 12 shows a similar regression for the Reinhart-Rogoff classification, which does 
not identify hard pegs as a separate category, so all the coefficients in the RMSE regression 
are positive, and all those in the R-squared regression are negative.  “Freely falling” is a 
special category for high-inflation economies, so it is not surprising that this category shows 
even greater volatility than free floats. 
Both tables suggest a fairly high correlation between our exchange rate flexibility 
measures and other regime classification schemes. 
  
                                                     
8 As a referee has suggested, Poisson estimation is preferred to ordinary least squares in view of the distribution 
of the dependent variables (see Figure 1). 
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Table 11. Annual exchange rate flexibility measures and the IMF de facto classification (1980-2012)  
Dependent Var.:         RMSE R2 
Numeraire: CHF JPY GBP CHF JPY GBP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Currency Board -1.814*** -1.825*** -1.785*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.030*** 
 (-3.506) (-3.511) (-3.340) (3.128) (4.799) (4.300) 
Basket Peg 0.347 0.232 0.389 -0.063*** -0.045*** -0.075*** 
 (1.326) (0.845) (1.439) (-3.974) (-3.516) (-4.940) 
Band 0.418 0.366 0.345 -0.161*** -0.070*** -0.133*** 
 (1.552) (1.293) (1.308) (-5.540) (-3.774) (-4.744) 
Crawl 0.940*** 0.922*** 0.981*** -0.119*** -0.116*** -0.140*** 
 (3.857) (3.680) (3.873) (-5.884) (-6.157) (-6.401) 
Managed Float 1.348*** 1.317*** 1.397*** -0.238*** -0.229*** -0.310*** 
 (6.315) (5.890) (6.261) (-11.254) (-12.060) (-12.955) 
Independent 
Float 1.636*** 1.519*** 1.655*** -0.473*** -0.401*** -0.539*** 
 (7.547) (6.478) (7.310) (-12.174) (-7.997) (-13.482) 
Constant -5.031*** -4.993*** -5.076*** -0.037*** -0.031*** -0.035*** 
 (-22.577) (-21.337) (-21.691) (-5.173) (-5.671) (-5.421) 
Sample size 5166 5182 5186 5166 5182 5186 
Pseudo-R2  0.07 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Notes. Estimation method: Poisson. The omitted category is a conventional peg. Regressions exclude 
the observations for USD, EUR (1999 onwards), FRF (up to 1998), DEM(up to 1998), and the 
numéraire currency. Standard errors are clustered for each country and t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Rmse is the root mean square error of the regression. See notes to Table 1 for regime categories. 
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Table 12. Annual exchange rate flexibility measures and the Reinhart-Rogoff classification (1970-
2011)  
Dependent Var.:         RMSE R2 
Numeraire: CHF JPY GBP CHF JPY GBP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Crawl (±2%) 1.443*** 0.007*** 1.516*** -0.111*** -0.090*** -0.116*** 
 (6.926) (11.594) (9.454) (-9.501) (-9.981) (-9.440) 
Band (±2 to 5%) or 1.853*** 0.011*** 1.864*** -0.208*** -0.166*** -0.215*** 
Managed Float (8.638) (12.167) (11.628) (-8.970) (-9.369) (-8.861) 
Free Float 2.760*** 0.027*** 2.658*** -0.554*** -0.594*** -0.669*** 
 (9.940) (3.923) (9.207) (-8.656) (-4.459) (-9.533) 
Freely Falling 3.321*** 0.057*** 3.427*** -0.363*** -0.390*** -0.384*** 
 (15.027) (10.104) (19.503) (-10.145) (-10.106) (-9.444) 
Dual Currency 1.759*** 0.011** 1.917*** -0.088*** -0.096*** -0.169** 
 (4.029) (2.280) (4.596) (-2.964) (-2.771) (-2.562) 
Constant -6.082*** 0.002*** -6.167*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.046*** 
 (-30.313) (7.105) (-41.467) (-8.836) (-9.920) (-8.257) 
Sample size 5637 5668 5668 5637 5668 5676 
Pseudo-R2  0.12 0.22 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Estimation method: Poisson. The omitted category is a peg within a ±2% band. Regressions exclude 
the observations for USD, EUR (1999 onwards), FRF (up to 1998), DEM(up to 1998), and the 
numéraire currency. Standard errors are clustered for each country and t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Rmse is the root mean square error of the regression.  The categories are as follows. Managed Float: 
residual category.  Free Float: more than 20% of the monthly changes in the log of the exchange rate 
against every reference currency exceed 0.02.  Freely Falling: rapid depreciation and high inflation. 
Duel Currency: a parallel exchange rate exists but data are absent (if parallel market rate data exist, 
the classification is based on them). 
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9 Conclusions 
A simple and reliable regression method is used to generate an index of exchange rate 
flexibility that, if desired, may be converted into a binary classification of exchange rate 
regimes as in Bleaney and Tian (2014).  The method is not data-intensive and could easily be 
applied by other researchers. Monthly exchange rate movements of a currency against a 
floating numeraire currency are regressed on movements of the euro and the US dollar 
against the numeraire currency.  Where relevant, other potential anchor currencies are added 
to the regression.  Pegs are characterised by a low RMSE and a high R-squared, with the 
estimated coefficients indicating the anchor basket.  Results are robust to the choice of 
numeraire (except that the SDR tends to be misleading because of its correlation with the 
anchor currencies).  The thorny question of distinguishing floats from pegs with occasional 
parity changes can be addressed by examining the skewness of residuals; floats have 
relatively symmetric residuals whereas pegs with occasional parity changes do not.  The 
procedure can be repeated with outlying observations dummied out to distinguish pegs with 
parity changes from genuine floats.  A useful by-product of this procedure is that it also 
distinguishes “fixed” pegs (those without parity changes) from “variable” pegs (those with 
parity changes). 
 Managed floats have become increasingly popular amongst emerging markets and 
developing countries in the 21st century.  In a small but diminishing minority of cases, our 
results show that these are quasi-pegs to the US dollar, often with slightly wider target zones 
than announced pegs.  An increasing proportion of managed floats has similar volatility to 
independent floats, but even these have a tendency to track the US dollar. 
 The method can be used to generate an annual measure of flexibility, which shows a 
strong peak at relatively low levels of flexibility, and a long right tail (for the RMSE; for the 
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R-squared it is a long left tail).  The annual index displays a satisfactory degree of agreement 
with other regime classifications, but is richer in information, so it would be interesting to use 
it in testing, for example, whether there is a significant correlation between exchange rate 
flexibility and macroeconomic performance. 
 The index has several limitations. One is that, particularly for floating currencies, it 
may vary considerably from period to period, particularly if measured over relatively short 
periods such as a year.  For example, the index for the UK in the 21st century varies from a 
minimum of 0.0095 in 2006 to a maximum of 0.0319 in 2008.  High-inflation economies are 
likely to have high values whether they are genuinely floating or pegged with frequent 
devaluations.  Care also has to be taken in the event of a change of regime.  Nevertheless it 
would be interesting to see how the index correlates with macroeconomic outcomes; this is a 
topic that we leave to further research. 
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